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Abstract
In 1977, H1N1 influenza A virus reappeared after a 20-year absence. Genetic analysis indicated that this strain was missing
decades of nucleotide sequence evolution, suggesting an accidental release of a frozen laboratory strain into the general
population. Recently, this strain and its descendants were included in an analysis attempting to date the origin of pandemic
influenza virus without accounting for the missing decades of evolution. Here, we investigated the effect of using viral
isolates with biologically unrealistic sampling dates on estimates of divergence dates. Not accounting for missing sequence
evolution produced biased results and increased the variance of date estimates of the most recent common ancestor of the
re-emergent lineages and across the entire phylogeny. Reanalysis of the H1N1 sequences excluding isolates with unrealistic
sampling dates indicates that the 1977 re-emergent lineage was circulating for approximately one year before detection,
making it difficult to determine the geographic source of reintroduction. We suggest that a new method is needed to
account for viral isolates with unrealistic sampling dates.
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Introduction
Phylogenetic inference is an important tool for understanding
the origin and evolution of emerging pathogens [1]. For rapidly
evolving pathogens, such as RNA viruses, isolates sampled over
years or decades can be used to calibrate a molecular clock and
date divergence events [2]. However, if frozen laboratory strains
escape into the general population, they will be missing years of
nucleotide sequence evolution, and the date of isolation can be
misleading.
The most famous case of a released laboratory strain is the re-
emergent H1N1 influenza A virus which was first observed in
China in May of 1977 and in Russia shortly thereafter [3,4]. This
outbreak marked the return of a seasonal H1N1 human influenza
virus after a nearly 20-year absence following its displacement
during the 1957 H2N2 pandemic. Scientists quickly realized that
something was unusual about this re-emergent H1N1 strain; it was
genetically similar, though not identical, to an H1N1 isolate from
1950 [5,6]. Initially it was suggested that this virus could have lain
dormant or evolved slowly in non-human hosts for decades, but it
is now generally assumed that the virus was kept frozen in a yet
unidentified laboratory [7,8]. The glaring discrepancy between the
amount of inferred evolutionary time (Figure 1A) and amount of
sequence evolution (Figure 1B) leading to the 1977 outbreak
provides evidence supporting this conclusion.
In a recent paper estimating the age of human pandemic
influenza, Smith et al. [9] included the re-emergent H1N1
sequences in their analysis without correcting for the missing years
of evolution. Here, we investigated the effect of including
sequences with biologically unrealistic sampling dates on the
ability to estimate the time of most recent common ancestor
(tMRCA) in influenza virus.
Analysis and Discussion
First, the amount of evolutionary time missing from the branch
leading to the re-emergent H1N1 clade was inferred by examining
the discrepancy between the root-to-tip genetic distance and
sampling-year in the re-emergent H1N1 clade. This method was
possible because influenza virus experiences a steady rate of
sequence evolution [10]. Maximum likelihood phylogenies were
constructed for each influenza virus genome segment in PHYML
[11] under a GTR+C4 substitution model using sequences and
rooting from Smith et al. [9]. For each segment, we calculated the
distances between the regression line intercepts for the root-to-tip
genetic distance versus sampling year for the re-emergent H1N1
lineage and the other human influenza viruses (pre-1977 H1N1,
H2N2, and H3N2) (for method see [12]). Isolates in which
sampling year was not consistent with the amount of sequence
evolution (identified in [13,14]) were removed from these analyses.
There was a clear shift in the root-to-tip distance in the re-
emergent H1N1 clade. The slope of the re-emergent lineage and
the other human influenza virus had mean/median difference of
27 years (Figure 2), suggesting that the virus was frozen for
approximately 27 years before it re-emerged (e.g., virus isolated in
2007 is missing 27 years of mutations).
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estimates, Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (BMCMC)
phylogenetic inference was performed on each genome segment
for human influenza viral sequences (not including the 2009 H1N1
pandemic) and related non-human viral sequences in BEAST
v1.5.2 [15]. The first analysis used the same sequences and
sampling dates as Smith et al. [9]. The second analysis used the
same sequences but adjusted the age of all H1N1 viruses isolated
in or after 1977 by shifting their sampling date 27 years earlier.
Multiple independent BMCMC analyses were run for each
genome segment; convergence and adequate mixing (effective
sample size of all relevant parameters .200) was verified in Tracer
v1.5 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer). Each segment was
run between 100 and 300 million total generations, though burnin
size varied. Analysis of the PB1 segment (the largest dataset) is not
presented because it failed to converge.
Accounting for the 27-year shift in sampling dates in the re-
emergent H1N1 clade resulted in significantly lower variance (i.e.,
95% highest posterior density width) in the tMRCA estimates,
compared with the ‘‘uncorrected’’ analysis. The shifted dates
reduced the variance in the tMRCA estimate for the re-emergent
H1N1 viruses by 39% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.028)
(Table 1). Moreover, including the unadjusted sampling dates also
significantly increased the variance in divergence time estimation
across all nodes in the phylogeny by an average of 5% (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p=0.028). Thus, even distantly related nodes
were affected by the inclusion of the re-emergent H1N1 viral
isolates. However, this pattern of increased variance in divergence
time estimation was not seen in analysis of the M segment. The
reason for this is not clear as the M segment alignment and
BMCMC analysis was not remarkably different from those of the
other genome segments. Statistical analyses were performed using
Stata v11.0 (StataCorp LP).
The re-emergence of H1N1 is not the only instance in which the
year of sampling does not correspond to amount of sequence
evolution. Dozens of other influenza isolates have been identified
as having unrealistically short branch lengths, possibly resulting
from laboratory contamination, mislabeling, and/or re-introduc-
tion ([13,14]; accidental infection of a laboratory worker: A/
Canada/720/05). Many of these additional suspect sequences
were also included in the analysis by Smith et al. [9]. Furthermore,
other included samples are actually reassortant vaccine strains,
whose segments were isolated decades apart from one another
(e.g., A/New Jersey/1976 and A/Leningrad/54/1). In fact, A/
Leningrad/54/1, which has an erroneous sampling date of 1954,
is actually a reassortant vaccine with segments isolated in 1934 and
1977 [16,17,18]. This sequence alone accounts for the bimodal
distribution of node ages observed in the NA analysis (Table 1), as
one of the modes is not sampled after its removal. Based on the
results presented here, the inclusion of these and other sequences
with biologically unrealistic sampling dates can dramatically affect
tMRCA estimates and should be avoided.
Our observation of increased variance when calibrating with
unadjusted sampling dates prompted us to re-estimate the age of the
1977 re-emergent lineage using a dataset free of sequences with
biologically unrealistic sampling dates. Therefore, additional
BMCMC inference was performed on a representative sample of
99 human H1N1 viruses isolated between 1918 and 2009. The
sampling age of the re-emergent isolates was adjusted by 27 years.
Two independent BMCMC runs of 25 million generations were
performed for each segment. Model comparison was performed via
Bayes Factor in Tracer v1.5 (Text S1; Tables S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6,
S7, and S8); differences in tMRCA estimates among models were
trivial. Sequence alignments are available upon request.
Smith et al. [9] placed the mean tMRCA of the re-emergent
H1N1 lineage in 1974 or 1975; however, these estimates are
biased by the missing 27 years of sequence evolution. According to
our analysis, the re-emergent H1N1 lineage began diversifying
approximately one year before it was first detected in China and
Russia (sample size weighted average from [19]) (Figure 3); the
posterior distributions for the tMRCA of the re-emergent lineage
excludes the year of re-emergence. If the virus was circulating for
up to a year before detection, then it seems difficult to assign the
geographic source of re-introduction (i.e., China or Russia) based
solely on surveillance in 1977. This interpretation must be treated
with caution as our inference was powered to detect differences on
the order of calendar years, because the date of viral isolation was
measured in years and not in months or days.
We acknowledge that simply adjusting the re-emergent sampling
dates by 27 years may not be an ideal method to estimate the date of
re-emergence; however, the results presented here demonstrate that
some correction to the biased sampling dates is needed before
inferring divergence times. A new method is needed to account for
samples with unrealistic sampling dates. In the case of a re-emergent
clade, the amount of missingevolution along the branchleading tore-
emergence could be estimated as a model parameter in a Bayesian
framework. For single isolates with unrealistic sampling dates (e.g.,
laboratory contaminants and vaccine strains), the posterior distribu-
tion of the sampling date could be estimated during the analysis
i n s t e a do fb e i n gt r e a t e da saf i x e dv a l u e .
Re-emergence and laboratory contamination is a problem not
limited to influenza virus. A similar pattern of missing decades of
sequence evolution was recently observed in rabbit hemorrhagic
disease virus [20]. Furthermore, using strains that have undergone
long-term passage and selection in the laboratory, which is not
uncommon in studies estimating viral tMRCAs, would have the
opposite effect of lengthening branches [21]. It is likely that
calibrating a molecular clock using these laboratory-passaged
strains would also have detrimental effects on estimating tMRCAs.
To ensure reliable divergence time estimates, we must start with
high quality datasets.
Figure 1. Maximum clade credibility phylogeny of human
H1N1 influenza virus HA segment with unadjusted sampling
dates. The topologies of (A) a chronogram in which branch lengths
represent time and (B) a phylogram in which branch lengths represent
nucleotide substitutions are identical. Avian and swine influenza virus
lineages were removed for ease of viewing. Arrows indicate the lineage
leading to the re-emergent HIN1 clade; boxes designate the re-
emergent H1N1 clade.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.g001
Influenza Divergence Times
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Text S1 Model selection methods
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s001 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S1 Bayes factor model test on HA segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s002 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S2 Bayes factor model test on M segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s003 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S3 Bayes factor model test on NA segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s004 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S4 Bayes factor model test on NP segment.
Figure 2. Root-to-tip genetic distance versus sampling year for human influenza virus segments. (A) HA, (B) M, (C), NA, (D) NP, (E), NS, (F)
PA, (G) PB1, and (H) PB2 segments are shown. Pre-1977 H1N1, H2N2, H3N2 isolates are indicated with blue Xs, and re-emergent H1N1 isolates are
indicated with red Os.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.g002
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Table S5 Bayes factor model test on NS segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s006 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S6 Bayes factor model test on PA segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s007 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S7 Bayes factor model test on PB1 segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s008 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S8 Bayes factor model test on PB2 segment.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.s009 (0.03 MB
DOC)
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Table 1. Highest posterior density (HPD) width in years of the
node leading to the re-emergent H1N1 lineage before and
after a 27-year shift in sampling dates.
Segment
HPD width
(reported
sampling years)
HPD width (27-year
shift
for re-emergent
lineage)
Ratio of HPDs
(reported:shift)
HA 4.48 2.55 0.57
M 5.96 6.41 1.07
NA
a 27.31 2.26 0.08
NA-mode 1 3.17 – 0.71
NA-mode 2 4.48 – 0.49
NP 6.42 4.17 0.65
NS 5.18 3.54 0.68
PA 4.65 2.95 0.64
PB2 5.20 3.09 0.59
aNA had a bimodal distribution for the age of the node leading to re-emergent
H1N1 lineage. Mode 1 was 1973–1977 and mode 2 was 1949–1953. Inclusion
of either mode does not alter the pattern of significantly decreased variance
following the 27-year shift.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.t001
Figure 3. Posterior distributions for the tMRCA of the re-
emergent H1N1 lineage for all eight influenza virus segments.
Squares are mean values, triangles are median values, bars are 95%
highest probability densities, and the dashed line is the sample size
weighted average.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011184.g003
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